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Abstract: As the Department of Defense strives to take the social sciences more seriously in the face 
of threats emanating from the non-West, it confronts several challenges.  Among them, we 
Westerners cannot model non-Western minds.  Nor can we devise a methodology that will 
accurately capture contingency.  We may already be doing our “scientific” best with “pattern of life” 
targeting.  Consequently, DoD should invest more heavily in individuals who already have an 
affinity for, and interest in, the non-West and who show promise as future commanders and 
talented analysts rather than spend large sums on trying to devise more comprehensive models, 
methodologies, and metrics. 
 
till stumped by Islamists more than a decade after 9/11, the Department of 
Defense continues to try to make better use of the social sciences.  But the 
ways in which it does so pose several dangers.1  For instance, thinking that 
“the social sciences can provide a rigorous framework” to explain “a broad 
spectrum of complex social threats facing the United States in the twenty-first 
 
1 For the purposes of this essay, non-Westerners are people(s) who emphasize the group or 
collective over the individual. The contrast I am drawing is between us and tribal societies—
peoples for whom social relations are morally fraught and not just transactional (as they 
often are for Westerners).  Chinese and many other Asians might well be included under this 
loose definition of non-Western, but lumping everyone non-Western together defies my 
main point: it is all the differences, and not similarities, among people that matter. 
S 
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century including radicalization, cyber radicalization, instability, and insurgency” or 
that such a framework can “guide research, analysis, and operations” reflects classic 
American optimism.2  But, unfortunately, a “comprehensive analytical framework” 
is not possible.3  Attempting to build such a framework ignores the entire history of 
anthropology—a discipline that has recently begun to disintegrate because 
professionals across an array of sub-fields cannot countenance one another’s 
perspectives, let alone their methodological approaches. Worse, it distracts from 
investing in what is needed most: individuals who understand the non-West. There 
are two reasons for my assertion.  
 
Conceptual Problems 
First, it will always be possible to find social scientists who will sign up for 
the idea that a comprehensive analytical framework can be devised, and validated.  
They will support this idea for the same reason many highly qualified Ph.D.s often 
agree with one another and form distinct “‘schools of thought.”  Most academics, 
like humans in general, enjoy the comfort of crowds.  They also thrive on rivalries, 
which is what turns schools of thought into competing schools, which would be fine if 
the schools remained impartial.  But, instead, they turn partisan; those most talented 
at articulating the “group’s view” overstate both their and their opponents’ positions 
in order to win over others.  Or, as Hegel and Marx might have put it: thesis 
guarantees antithesis.  Eventually, an upstart third school will propose a synthesis.  
But, the truth is that accuracy does not always lie somewhere in the middle.  
Consensuses can be wrong and split-the-difference aggregated compromises can 
mislead. 
Meanwhile, social scientists’ ability to split the difference (for instance, to go 
from primordialism to instrumentalism to constructivism) should expose the degree 
to which the social sciences are nothing like the more dependable of the hard 
sciences, which can accurately describe and predict irrefutable realities—otherwise, 
planes would not fly and machines would not run.  Tellingly, too, physicists did not 
split their differences in order to split atoms.  Instead, J. Robert Oppenheimer’s 
scientists came up with different ways to achieve fission. 
Bottom line: the conceit that a framework can be devised to cover the 
West, the non-West, and all the differences within and between, reflects little more 
than a particular Western point of view, not universal in any way.  What such a 
notion already misses is the possibility that it is different ways of thinking that make 
non-Westerners non-Western. 
Although the prevailing groupthink among anthropologists and others has 
long been that humans are humans the world over, and that we are more alike than 
unalike in our perceptions, logics, and emotions, ample evidence suggests this is not 
the case.  However, because this evidence does not square with the way social 
scientists are supposed to think, the academy has developed a vested interest in 
 
2 Hriar Cabayan et al., “Operational Relevance of Behavioral & Social Science to DoD 
Missions,” SMA Report (DoD), March 2013, p. 4 




rejecting the possibility that profound differences exist.  By profound differences, I 
refer to differences in priorities, values, and drives. 
 To be clear, just because profound differences exist does not mean people 
cannot understand many things about one another across cultures.  This would be 
akin to saying men and women cannot understand one another.  They can—but 
they still differ significantly in perspectives, priorities, values, concerns, and 
expectations.  Take, for instance, sex, the one act that encourages both parties to try 
to be in sync.  Men and women can think they know what each other feel when it 
comes to literal (hetero)sexual relations, but they can never actually know.  In some 
relationships this inability to really know turns out to be all to the good; in others it is 
disastrous. 
  Cross-cultural differences amount to similar kinds of differences between 
some (but not all) societies, regarding some (but certainly not all) things. Consider, 
for instance, how tribal peoples have purposely, consciously, and/or willfully 
prevented anthropologists from gaining access to (or understanding about) their 
most sacred religious practices and beliefs.  American Indian history is replete with 
examples.  Essentially, if I, as member of Tribe X, want you to understand 
something, I will do my best to explain and try to help you understand.  However, 
particularly when it comes to totems, taboos, and rituals in general, forget it; these 
will remain impenetrable, and thus impossible for you to accurately interpret 
without assistance. 
As humans, we are all amateur anthropologists, sociologists, and 
psychologists.  As dedicated observers of other people, this makes us much more 
“natural” at the “-ologies” than we are at economics or political science.  But 
consequently, it is also extremely difficult for us to change each other’s minds about 
the nature of subject matter we have all been studying since birth: namely, our 
fellow human beings. 
Ask anyone who has taught anthropology for any length of time.  Formal 
education can only go so far in rooting out misconceptions and misperceptions.  
Some students come to class ready to have their assumptions challenged (and will 
buy into whatever are the latest trends).  Others end up willing to re-think some 
things.  However, a percentage of students simply refuse to shift their point of view 
at all.  Meanwhile, anything taught is pre-digested—by those doing the teaching.  
This means that what students receive is, at best, second-hand, while if it happens to 
concern people or a part of the world students have never visited, it is all just 
theoretical. 
None of this is ideal.  In the same way that no one can be turned into a 
decent speaker of another language without interacting with fluent speakers of that 
language, getting people to understand non-Westerners requires spending time with 
non-Westerners.  Some direct experience is vital.  Or, stated candidly: you cannot 
get inside another way of thinking once or twice removed. 
   This is something the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps know in 
their bones.  Otherwise, they would not need to put everyone through basic training 
—recruits could simply be shown several months’ worth of PowerPoint® 
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presentations instead.  It is also why those who urge that the Department of 
Defense broadens Service members’ experiences with time spent studying abroad 
deserve support.4 
Only two methods exist for transmitting an appreciation for how different 
the non-West is: first, via deep first-hand exposure, and second, by ensuring that 
members of the military learn more history—which is how experience is gained 
second-hand.  Both provide context.  Both also expand and shift people’s base of 
knowledge, which is the only way to alter their perspectives.  As for building 
expertise, that can only be done by iteratively encountering non-Westerners and 
studying the non-West. 
In an ideal world, the Armed Services would carefully select and invest in 
those individuals best suited for this kind of exposure, individuals who show 
promise as future commanders and/or talented analysts. Undoubtedly, this kind of 
talent management would be expensive and difficult.  Nevertheless, one might think 
that if—as is being suggested—operators in the future will need to be the “masters 
of the human domain,” then the ability to excel (and not just cope) cross-culturally 
would already be considered as critical a trait to assess as is leadership.  But it is not.  
Of course, even if it were acknowledged to be a critical capability, the military would 
then need to overcome another of its biases, which is to treat traits as skills.  For its 
own institutional reasons—and in keeping with the conviction that leaders can be 
made (and are not just born)—the U.S. Military typically views traits as nothing 
more than skills that it can train.  But certainly, in the case of cross-cultural affinity, 
this constitutes a major error. 
Cross-cultural affinity represents the first major problem for the United 
States Military as it strives to take the social sciences more seriously.  To begin with, 
not everyone has it.  Nor is cross-cultural affinity transferable—either from person 
to person, or from location to location.  For instance, everyone loves to cite T.E. 
Lawrence as the paragon of cross-cultural ability.  But, while Lawrence may well 
have been able to out-Bedouin the Bedouin, it is clear that he would not have been 
as comfortable, or as successful, had he been assigned to operate in any location 
other than Arabia; even he admitted he would have done miserably with town-
dwelling versus desert-dwelling Arabs—never mind with Japanese, Chinese or some 
other set of people. 
In addition, Lawrence was a Bedouinist well before World War I and the 
Arab Revolt kicked off.  Consequently, his example—like that of Joseph Stilwell, 
Douglas MacArthur, and numerous others—should further argue for carefully 
crafting a selection process, investing in a select number of individuals, and ensuring 
that they become familiar with the non-West prior to the onset of hostilities.5  As for 
how much social science training such individuals would need, the answer is very 
little if selection were undertaken correctly. 
Indeed, the military is on the verge of making operating in the human 
domain far more complicated than it needs to be.  For instance, no one gleans more 
information faster in unfamiliar, chaotic settings than journalists.  During the pre-
 
4 Though then the time spent abroad needs to be in the non-West, not Western Europe. 




Internet heyday of objective newspapering, journalists only needed to carry a 
notepad, a pen, and six questions into the field with them.  The six questions were: 
who, what, where, when, why, and how?  Reporters did not need a social science 
slide rule, a manual, or a set of algorithms. 
So, why do those leading the military think they need such expensive, 
sophisticated tools today? 
A cynical answer would be that the defense-intelligence-industrial complex 
is pushing them in this direction because it stands to profit.  More reasonable 
answers could well include the military’s need to disseminate standardized or 
standardizable tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) or its equally 
understandable need for inputs it can sequence.  Then, too, we Americans clearly 
like to engineer solutions.  There is also our affinity for technology, with techniques 
being the closest thing to technology that social scientists have to offer.  Of course, 
it could also be that some people truly believe it is possible to devise a social science 
equivalent of a C-130 or an M-4—a reliable, modifiable system/platform that 
should prove useful in all sorts of environments for decades to come. 
However, while it may be possible to field strip (as in disassemble) another 
culture into its constituent pieces and parts (which is something the best 
anthropologists proved able to do decades ago), figuring out how to get the enemy 
to undo himself is hardly the same.  This requires individuals with a fingerspitzengefuhl, 
or instinct, for both the enemy and for us.6  No model or framework can help 
individuals figure out how to develop this.  Nor will a model help anyone gauge how 
well their subordinates are doing.  For starters, any model, framework, or set of 
metrics would have to flex too much to accommodate the fact that every situation is 
unique in critically subtle ways. Indeed, the entire sweep of military history should 
serve as a cautionary reminder that it is the differences between them and us, then and 
now, and here and there that always matter.7 
Unfortunately, the re-usability of certain techniques can prove alluringly 
misleading.  Take the combined effects of signals intelligence (SIGINT), drones, 
and special operators, a combination that has been credited with undoing networks 
in multiple locales: Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia.  As General Stanley McChrystal 
makes clear in My Share of the Task, and as Admiral William H. McRaven’s push for a 
Global SOF Network implies, the organization both men headed—Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC)—has developed and continues to refine a targeting 
methodology it believes it can and should apply globally. 
Yet, just because TTPs can be applied successfully in a variety of settings 
does not mean that they add up to overall success.  Has the application of this 
methodology achieved permanent game-changing effects on the enemy’s inability to 
adapt in any one of these locales?  Have we dampened the enemy’s ardor anywhere?  
 
6 Anna Simons, “Got Vision? What It Is and Why We Need It,” Strategic Studies Institute, 
July 2010. 
7 Considerable debate exists on whether history belongs to the social sciences or to the 
humanities, with those who believe it belongs to the humanities pointing to its narrative (as 
in, this-is-a-unique-story) approach. 
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The answers to both these and related questions, no matter how discomfiting, 
should cause defense analysts to rethink what constitutes success, especially when 
metrics that can be made to suggest we are succeeding belie definitive results.8 
Using an internally consistent logic to prove an operational concept is 
always problematic.  Consider, for instance, the Son Tay raid to rescue POWs in 
Vietnam.  It is still taught as a supremely successful operation even though no 
prisoners were rescued because none were there when the raid occurred. Or, if we 
return to Special Operations Forces’ activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly SOF 
has mastered its environment in the sense that numerous bad actors and entire 
networks have been (and still are being) removed from the battlefield.  Targeting 
individuals and networks halfway around the world from the United States is an 
unquestionably impressive feat.  Yet, to judge the effects of a methodology on 
having successfully applied it still tells us nothing about whether the results we tout 
are the results we should have sought. Or, to be truly impolitic, absent an overarching 
strategy, operational and tactical successes—as in, “we plan, we execute the plan, 
ergo we succeed”—will always be tautologically satisfying.  Beneath the churn, 
however, lurks a bubble in the making.9 
Meanwhile, were a social science approach to be used to rethink military 
methods overall—and not just ways in which uniformed personnel should tackle the 
human domain—the trifurcation into tactical, operational, and strategic levels of 
analysis would likely disappear.  As the terms “strategic corporal” and “tactical 
general” suggest, clear distinctions between these three levels no longer exist if they 
ever did.  From a human terrain perspective, a far more logical method for dividing 
and nesting responsibilities would instead re-focus on local, regional, and supra-
regional (or global) spans of control. Imagine: if the military sliced reality more 
realistically, it could shift everyone from an overly linear “crawl, walk, run” 
approach to having to consider the effects of actions short- through long-term.   Not 
only would this  “liberate” commanders at all levels to adjust and readjust their 
“ways and means” situationally, but, a reallocation of labor would  help mitigate 
micro-management and other current scourges, and  also could assist with mission 
command—but all of these are issues beyond the scope of this article. 
Here the question is to what extent twenty-first century “ways and means” 




Without question, today’s modeling capabilities offer one distinct advantage 
over those of the recent past: they can capture change over time, and even point to 
the significance of timing and the convergence of events.  They, thus, ensure that 
more dynamism is infused into the ways models depict reality. But what they still 
 
8 In some regards the War on Terror resembles the War on Drugs.  DoD may consider Plan 
Colombia to be a success, but at what cost to Mexico?   
9 To return to the “comprehensive analytical framework” goal: just because numerous cross-
checks will be built into constructing the framework—thereby making devising the framework 




cannot do, any more than social scientists can, is take into account (or account for) 
the force of personalities, never mind interactions among personalities. 
Human chemistry, thus, becomes the second major problem. Social 
scientists have always been better at mapping the physics of human relations than the 
dynamics among individuals.  This, after all, is how we get social structure.  Also, 
social scientists can help with “who is where vis a vis whom, and what,” both in real 
time and over time.  But what social scientists are not good at explaining is why 
people might do what they do when they do it—either in advance or retrospectively.  
Even with the benefit of hindsight, singular explanations are faulty for being 
singular, while the more compelling an explanation is, the less honest it is likely to 
be about what it does not reveal.10 
For instance, say you are trying to make sense of the politics afoot in Somalia’s 
latest version of a central government.  At a minimum, you would need to 
understand: 
 
 1) intra- and inter-clan dynamics—historically, locally, sub-nationally (e.g., at 
the district level), and nationally. 
 
In order to understand those dynamics, you would also need to understand: 
 
 2) local socio-ecologies countrywide—e.g., the distribution of resources; 
relations between sub-populations and their modes of livelihood and sources of 
income; the cumulative effects of differential development, etc. 
 
 3) regional politics—to include cross-border relations with Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Djibouti and, moving outward from there: Egypt, Eritrea, the Gulf states 
 
 4) supra-local level politics—ties with the former colonial powers Italy, 
France, and Britain; and the Cold War powers: the United States, USSR, East 
Germany, West Germany, etc. 
 
 You would have to examine how all of these intersected with each other, 
and then were transected (or bisected) by both timing (when events occurred) and 
personalities (of formal leaders, informal leaders, traditional leaders, spoilers, and so 
on). 
 Just ask Somalis.  None of this can be adequately captured in a neat 
retrospective narrative that all actors (or witnesses) would consider accurate. So, 
how then do you choose what to include, exclude, turn into variables, or quantify 
when it comes to trying to model Somalis’ decision-making, thought processes, or 
likely future actions?  Clearly, that would depend on whose accounts you rely on—
 
10 There is no more vivid proof of this than the first blush of books about the Iraq war by 
George Packer, Tom Ricks, and others.  Who these journalists could and could not interview 
colors their narrative, which nonetheless is presented as if it is seamless eyewitness history.  
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while you cannot reasonably determine whose accounts to rely on without sufficient 
prior knowledge and an ability to read Somalis.  In other words, you will not have a 
reliable sense of what to draw a bead on without already knowing what you are 
looking at – in which case, it is not you who needs a model, method, or set of 
metrics, but those to whom you want to convey what you know.   
 Certainly, many things can be known and documented: dates, names, 
sequences.  However, influences and reasons for why people behave as they do are 
difficult to capture, and, even if captured, are impossible to accurately weight.  
Individuals cannot always articulate to themselves why they do what they do, and 
especially not when we, as humans, are all subject to self-deception.  
 Take decision trees.  For a time (and maybe still) some anthropologists 
thought these could illuminate how people make decisions.  But whenever I sat in 
on discussions about decision trees, I was reminded of a visit to the opthamologist, 
and his questions about which lens was better: 1 or 2?  After going through a series 
of different 1s and 2s in an artificial, dimly lit environment, I invariably reached the 
point where I could no longer tell—which may have been the opthamologist’s aim.   
 Decision trees are even worse because they require people to rationalize ex 
post facto, as you (the anthropologist) walk them through a set of  "why did you 
choose A and not B?" questions that they never posed to themselves.   
 Arguably, whenever people have to decide something—as in weigh options 
—that is a sure sign they do not already know what to do.  If they do not know what 
to do, then (by definition) they have entered the realm of the unknown, where 
getting from A to B requires plunging ahead or a leap of faith (no matter how small 
the step taken may actually feel).  Essentially, choice boils down to a gut call. 
Ironically, this remains true no matter how much advice people solicit.  And, even 
should they cede control to a methodology that, too, is a choice. 
 Thus, although data in the aggregate may point to the wisdom of crowds 
and Big Data may promise "big" social science, that still will not get us inside the 
heads of the Saddam Husseins, Hamid Karzais, or Bashar al-Assads of the world—
individuals whose thinking has presumably been studied in depth by intelligence 
agencies.  Meanwhile, what about the thinking of jihadists no one has heard of? 
 In other words, in addition to there being no way to devise a methodology 
that will ever accurately capture contingency, let alone inarticulable intuition, there is 
the problem of opaque non-Western worlds, which brings us to the third major 
problem.  
 Mapping social structure and trying to understand the principles that guide 
behavior in tribal societies can certainly yield a lot of information, especially since 
gathering an abundance of information is necessary to map the social structure in 
the first place.  In fact, this is one reason earlier generations of anthropologists were 
drawn to kinship charts.  
   However, relying on genealogy creates a Goldilocks challenge.  Too heavy a 
focus on kinship will result in inadvertent misdirection, since what no kinship chart 
can reveal is the content of people’s relations, let alone the chemistry among them.  
What do I mean by chemistry?—who people like, who they dislike, and how much 
of either emotion they can afford to reveal.  Emotion and chemistry matter not only 




suspicion, mistrust, and distrust builds, but because some personalities inspire more 
of this than others. 
 Also, no matter how important genealogy might seem—and regardless of 
whether individuals trace descent up their father’s line, mother’s line, or both 
lines—cross-cutting ties likewise matter.  These can include ties to in-laws, or to 
anyone outside of a blood relation: neighbors, school mates, work colleagues, 
members of a religious brotherhood, and so on.  Overall, even when genealogy acts 
as the fixed axis that indelibly "fixes" identities, it hardly prevents individuals from 
falling into other inter-personal orbits; individuals can still develop relationships that 
will throw a monkey wrench into others’ ability to always predict their behavior. 
 Shrewd leaders in all societies know how to make strategic use of just such 
social information, and ambitious social actors will play on (and with) both the fixed 
and the flexible elements embedded in what they know about others’ associations.  
They also usually use such information with a degree of suppleness no outsiders can 
track.  Not even all insiders can—otherwise, rivals would never be able to one-up 
one another. 
 Consequently, what this means is that they will always have more complete 
information about themselves than we will have, which means we will always be: 1) 
at a disadvantage, and 2) playing catch-up.  Our advantages come from being able to 
gain more information about other factions, external actors, and those whom locals 
don’t have access to—which  should  enable us to put together a more complete 
overarching picture.  But the weeds will always belong to them.  Thus, my argument 
in “Got Vision?”: instead of us ineffectively trying to reproduce what they know, we 
should identify those who already have that knowledge (e.g., their Connectors, 
Mavens, and Salesmen) and tap into them.  
   I say this, too, because the most difficult challenge the non-West poses for 
social scientists is that we Westerners cannot model non-Western minds.  Nor is it 
clear that non-Westerners raised in the West or educated according to Western 
methods can do much better.11 
 This is not a topic anyone in academe wants to touch with a ten-foot pole.  
As alluded to at the outset, most anthropologists continue to insist that there is a 
psychic unity of mankind: our cultural differences are really pretty fungible.  Never 
mind that many people—and, indeed, many peoples—are willing to die on behalf of 
cultural differences, or that no one has been able to say definitively which portions 
of human behavior are hard- rather than soft-wired.  But just consider: the very idea 
that we think in terms of hard- and soft-wiring is itself Western-centric. 
 In addition to the fact that “wiring” is eminently Western, computers and 
networks are, as well.  Indeed, no such things as non-Western computers or non-
Western software exist.  There are non-Western-manufactured computers, just as there 
is code written by non-Westerners.  But, conceptually, there is no non-Western 
 
11  Think of Edward Said who, in his autobiography, and only in passing, admits that he did 
not understand the draw of tribes or blood ties for Middle Easterners.  
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personal computer any more than there is any other class of artificially-powered 
machinery invented outside the West.12 
 Does this matter? I do not know, but suspect it must since it suggests a gap 
that, even if only initially accidental and geographic, appears to have become 
cumulative over time.13  Still more germane to the 3Ms: there is no such thing as 
non-Western social network analysis.  This does matter.  Here is how. 
 Take the Italian mob—not exactly a non-Western organization.  In their 
heyday, members of the Mafia probably did not think of themselves in social 
network analysis terms.  If asked to depict themselves graphically, their image 
probably would not have looked anything like the FBI’s line and block charts, while 
the descriptive they likely would have used for themselves would have been 
family—not network. Granted, in the interim, images popularized by Hollywood 
have become so internalized that members of today’s Mafia may see themselves 
exactly as the authorities do.  But this is surely not the case for tribal peoples. 
 People in tribal societies do not think of themselves in terms of networks 
and no one draws kinship charts.14  They do not need to.  At the same time, the 
most politically astute (and connected) individuals carry what we would consider to 
be Rolodexes® full of information around with them in their heads.  Do we know 
how they would depict this information graphically if we asked them to?  No.  Do 
we know whether they could depict it graphically at all?  No, again. 
 Many potential analogies spring to mind for how non-Westerners make use 
of their connections. One I used several decades ago for Somalis was tending 
traplines.  Yet, our most enduring images for how people relate to each other 
remain tree-based.15  The classic genealogical approach begins with a trunk, 
representing people’s root-stock.  Sub-groups branch off from it, and further sub-
divide.  More recently, trees have been tipped on their sides and now resemble dog 
pedigree charts (as seen in Ancestry.com television commercials, for example).  
Tellingly, the anthropological version still remains vertical: the founder of a group 
sits at the top of the chart—all his progeny, their progeny, and the splits among 
them flow from him. 
 Yet, regardless of which set of images we prefer, none describes intra-tribal 
social relations from a tribal perspective, while even if members did think of 
themselves as individuals in trees, they would be looking at the tree—and one 
another—from a twig’s or branch’s point of view, and not as we do, in the round. 
 
12  An abacus may compute, but not without a human manipulating the beads. 
13  It says quite a bit about the political correctness of the “–ologies” that no one discusses 
such matters these days, since the cause clearly has nothing to do with social science’s old 
shibboleth of race. People from all races and genetic backgrounds are as Western today as 
any WASP—and are over-represented in the IT realm. 
14  Of course, police probably do—but no one else in an adversarial relationship with one 
another does. 
15  Trees are all wrong for lots of reasons: they are static structures whose branches may 
wave in the wind, but otherwise never change position.  Yet, as the German anthropologist 
Gunther Schlee painstakingly demonstrated decades ago, entire lineages will shift identities 
(or, to stick with the tree metaphor, will successfully remove themselves from one tree and 




 As for what kind of chart we might design that would mark an 
improvement on these, I have joked in classes about Google Social Structure, 
something that would enable analysts to zoom in and out from micro to macro and 
back again, much as is done with Google Earth®.  The problem with anything like 
Google Social Structure, however, is that no matter how analytically convenient 
zooming in and out might be, it would still offer only a distorted view of people’s 
lived reality, which in turn would distort our view of how others navigate their 
reality.  Among the reasons: no one zooms in and out of his/her own life from 
micro to macro with everything remaining “to scale.” 
 Or, to put the problem in classically anthropological terms, the real issue 
with any graphic analysis is that it schematizes our version of others’ reality from an 
outside-in (or etic), not inside-out (or emic) perspective.  Social network analyses 
might look like they tell us who values whom, given the frequency (or infrequency 
and secrecy) of contacts, as represented by the size of nodes, the density of links, or 
what have you.  But the only thing networks really map is a set of transaction-based 
connections—the visible/audible/physical residue of people’s interactions.  Among 
people(s) who have mutual dependencies and moral interdependencies, however, 
associations are never just transactional.  All relations are laden with meaning, to 
include neglected relations, since even neglect means something. 
 In many if not most non-Western societies, the heaviest moral 
commitments are typically unspoken. How then can we, as outsiders, accurately 
assess what is really prompting people to act?  Are people doing each other favors 
out of moral compulsion, convenience, co-incidence, or some combination? And, 
how can we tell? And then, what happens when one set of commitments or loyalties 
is cross-cut by other allegiances?  Maybe commitments are life-long but only 
occasionally activated.  Or, maybe individuals temporarily choose to be 
“unavailable” to others. As the standard catch-line “I against my brother, my 
brothers and I against our cousins, our cousins and us against the world” implies, 
contexts always shift.  When they do, so can alliances and enmities. 
 In tribal settings everything can depend.  Thus, even if we learned 
everything there is to know about others’ personal histories and their prior 
interactions, we still would never know enough.  At best, this level of detail might 
reveal who might throw in with or line up against whom, and what could motivate 
them.  But since people often decide what to do depending on who else is aligned, 
how, predicting is not just a contingent affair; contingence itself is situational. 
 Situationalism is the lubricant in tribal settings—and is determined by who of 
note acts when, while who is of note depends on the situation.16  This brings us back 
to the significance of personalities and timing, the two critical variables, factors and 
vectors (it is hard to know what to call them), which will remain beyond the 3Ms’ 
reach—akin to “acts of God.” 
 
16 Situationalism is not only important in tribal settings.  Its valences just happen to be 
different under acephalous vs. hierarchical conditions.  
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 Ironically, yet another reason DoD should set aside the idea of a 
comprehensive analytical anything when it comes to human behavior is that 
organizations like JSOC may have already perfected the only viable method for 
targeting individuals and degrading networks, by relying on “patterns of life.”  What 
recent successful targeting demonstrates is that if you track someone in real time 
with enough dedicated assets, there is only so far he can travel or only so long he 
can disappear before, eventually, you will pick him up again.  Of course, the 
downside to using “patterns of life” to nail people is that once potential targets 
know you are studying them, they adapt and evolve.  Of course, too, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, the FATA, and other locations where U.S. Forces have tracked bad actors via 
their “patterns of life” have been places where the United States has possessed 
drone (and air and signal) dominance.  Perhaps this will continue to hold for all 
tribal zones.  But it certainly will not hold for all adversaries in the future. 
 Arguably then—and without even realizing it—DoD may have already 
reached the limits of what it can do well in the realm of social science: namely, real-
time “pattern of life” analysis, as opposed to trying to get inside non-Westerners’ 
heads by etically mapping their societies. 
 
Alternatives to the 3Ms 
 
 As for how else DoD might take advantage of the social sciences, the short 
answer is that the Department of Defense should stop trying to create a 
comprehensive analytical framework.  Instead, it should take the hefty sums of 
money going to the Pentagon’s social science industrial complex and invest them in 
individuals who have an affinity for non-Westerners and their situationalism.  
Frontload selection.  Rely on flesh-and-blood ethnographic sensors.  Then, let those 
who have developed an appreciation for the non-West decide which of the 3Ms to 
use as their communication aids. 
 It could well be that the best way to make the non-West make sense to 
members of the U.S. Military writ large is to do so graphically, through charts, 
models, and graphs.  But those with experience in, and an affinity for, the non-West 
need to be the judges of which of these tools to use.17  Technocrats should no more 
be the arbiters of this than policymakers who have spent no time on their own in 
the non-West should be allowed to craft strategy aimed at the non-West.18  
 
17 Should such individuals have to have an affinity for non-Westerners?  Yes.  Do such 
individuals have to approve of everything non-Westerners do?  Absolutely not.  But they do 
have to be cultural (not moral) relativists, able to make sense of the non-West for those for 
whom this does not come easily or naturally. 
18 Herbert Goldhamer  wrote “Over two thousand years ago, Aristotle had already observed 
that youths do extremely well in mathematics but that young men of practical wisdom are 
difficult to find.  Mathematics deals with universals and abstractions that do not require the 
prolonged context of a large variety of particulars that only a lengthy experience can give.” 
(The Adviser [Elsevier, 1978], p. 69).  Worth noting is that the policy realm is full of such 
young men (and women) these days, steeped in quantitative methods and theories learned in 




Otherwise, the 3M seduction will only further indenture soldiers and marines to 
databases, rather than the reverse. 
 Databases represent a very useful tool for storing and accessing 
information.  But populating them has now become a virtual end in itself.  Worse, 
by turning humans into bits and bytes, databases make information about people 
seem eminently manipulable, and people themselves increasingly reducible to a set 
(or sequence) of transactional relations.  This may play to Western sensibilities.  But 
no humans are this reducible.  And non-Westerners certainly are not. 
 Combat veterans, military historians, and others already know the extent to 
which intangible qualities like morale, esprit, and the "will to win" matter in conflict.  
Presumably, military leaders similarly recognize that no academic discipline or set of 
disciplines can explain group chemistry or why some social bonds are stronger than 
others.19  At the same time, what should be apparent to all participants and 
observers after a decade-plus of fixating on networks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, 
and elsewhere is that taking out nodes and snipping links is hardly sufficient.  What 
is needed, instead, is a solvent—though to dissolve people’s social bonds requires 
something altogether different than anything tried thus far. 
 Perhaps the inadequacy of social "science" tools will become clearer as the 
fascination with networks gives way to new constructs, which it is bound to do; 
progress promises nothing less.  In the meantime, it would not surprise me if the 
interim silver bullet does not turn out to be something like connectomes.  Sebastian 
Seung describes connectomes this way: “a connectome is the totality of connections 
between the neurons in a nervous system.”20  As he goes on to note, “Unlike your 
genome, which is fixed from the moment of conception, your connectome changes 
throughout life… there is good evidence that all four R’s—reweighting, 
reconnection, rewiring, and regeneration—are affected by your experiences.”21  
Essentially, connectomes make each of us our own dialectic. 
 Even better, like a tangle of cooked spaghetti, connectomes touch one 
another in multiple ways.  They thus do a much better job of graphically depicting 
our relations than the spirograph or splatter screen version of networked 
interactions do. 
 Yet, no matter how attractive the connectome metaphor might seem to be, 
it too presents a problem since not even those who study connectomes can explain 
how spurts of neurotransmitters turn themselves into thoughts, ideas, or images.  
Consequently, while connectomes are surely suggestive, they fall short; something 
vital still remains missing—which, in turn, suggests that metaphors might amount to 
a fourth M. 
 
19 Experientially, everyone in uniform should recognize this, too.  What accounts for some 
units possessing more esprit de corps or better morale than others?  Why do some gel better 
than others?  There is no formula.  If only there were, all units would always excel—across 
the board.  
20 Sebastian Seung, Connectome (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), p. xiii. 
21 Seung, Connectome, p. xv. 
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 Metaphors certainly seem useful, especially since, like analogies, they provide 
a vivid alternative to anything too quantitative.  However, metaphors (like analogies) 
fail to throw differences into high relief. Or to paraphrase the French anthropologist 
Claude Levi-Strauss, while metaphors, analogies, models, methodologies, and 
metrics may all be good to think, we are too prone to let them channel—not 
challenge—how we think.22 
 As for suitable alternatives, my proposal would be: open-ended questions 
that force members of the military to have to think in terms of positioning rather 
than just transactions.  Ironically, this way of thinking should already be familiar to 
those in uniform given the degree to which they routinely alter their behavior and 
even speech depending on the rank of those they interact with. 
 For example, by posing questions like: Who is where, vis a vis whom, and 
what?  Who colludes with whom?  How stable are their arrangements? And who has 
an interest in keeping them stable (or not)? it should be possible to probe relevant 
dynamics, especially since such questions can be scaled up or down, projected 
backward or forward, and used to compare between Time Now with Times Before.  
Of course, arguably the greatest advantage to a handful of questions is that they are 
easy to remember, eminently portable, and situationally ecumenical—much like the 
“who, what, when, where, why, and how?” questions that journalists historically 
used to unparalleled effect. 
 Finally, although it may seem silly to point out that particulars should not 
be generalized, combine this with the fact that all politics is never only local—since 
all sorts of outside influences have an impact, yet all conflict is locally fought (in the 
sense that it is waged somewhere, and usually in multiple somewheres)—and it should 
be obvious why DoD should forget ginning up some overly expensive and 
ultimately useless “comprehensive analytical framework.” Instead, the Services 
would do far better to put money where only lip service is paid right now.  Manage 
talent.  Determine who in uniform today has what it takes to discern 
how non-Western non-Westerners actually are (or are not), and invest 














22 Often models, charts, and graphs highlight differences rather than similarities.  Either way, 
any graphic approach will do one or the other, but cannot focus viewers simultaneously on 
both. 
